This paper aims to fill a gap in the scant literature on accounting practices in non-Anglo-Saxon countries in underresearched periods by exploring the Monte di Pietà of Ravenna, an Italian non-profit institution. The research draws upon original 18 th and 19 th century documents found in the Monte di Pietà of Ravenna and offers an internal perspective of the development of accounting technology before and after an 'intacco' episode, thus attempting to shed light on the significance of accounting in that context. The originality of the Ravenna episode, compared to other similar ones experienced by Monti, consists in its extension over time and in its recurrence by three generations of administrators linked by kinship bonds, who systematically damaged the Monte between 1797 and 1837. The new form of control of the Monte's activities after the "intacco" based on accounting technologies, and realised a new relation between power and knowledge in which accounting was the tool to exercise disciplinary power, thus making people more governable. Accounting technologies relied upon a more articulated financial statement that included the institute's transactions and events.
Introduction
Accounting influences and is influenced by organizations in which it acts upon, and for this reason accounting can be viewed as a social and institutional practice (Hopwood & Miller, 1994; Armstrong, 2015) . In this respect, Hopwood (2000) advocates the need to understand financial accounting practices beyond the analysis of financial report structures calls for studies that couple the social and institutional features of accounting in the field of accounting history. Researchers have conducted investigations and analyses of how accounting interacts with its social environment; this reflects a perspective in which accounting is no longer seen as only a technical practice reflecting its environment, but also as a social practice that both mirrors and determines its environment (Gomes, 2008; Gomes et al., 2011; Parker, 2015) . As indicated by Miller (1994, p. 20) , there is a need "to move beyond the boundaries of the organization and examine the social and institutional practice of accounting" in order to "to understand fully how particular ways of accounting have emerged, and why such significance is accorded to them".
The use of the theoretical perspective of accounting as a social practice inspired several studies regarding the history of accounting in "everyday settings involving various social, religious and other not-for-profit institutions" (Carnegie & Napier, 2012, 336) . Although there are several studies of accounting that use a historical perspective, little is known regarding accounting in non-profit organizations (Dobie, 2011) , and in religious organizations (Carmona & Ezzamel, 2006; Bigoni et al., 2013) . This paper aims to fill a gap in the scant literature on accounting practices in non-Anglo-Saxon countries in under-researched periods by exploring the Monte di Pietà of Ravenna, an Italian non-profit institution. The study of the Monte offers an internal perspective on the definition of responsibilities and on the development of accounting technology before and after a significant episode of change. Examining this perspective may illuminate the significance of accounting in that context. This study contributes to the accounting history literature by using a social and institutional framework to analyse accounting in the Monte di Pietà of Ravenna during the 18 th and 19 th centuries. Specifically, the non-profit is investigated here through the concepts of governmentality and disciplinary power (Foucault, 1991) , already used by other authors (Sharma et al 2012) within the accounting history field. Some accounting researchers (Miller and Rose 1990; Miller and Napier 1993) have already used these concepts in their analyses, arguing that accounting makes people more knowledgeable, calculable and governable, thus emphasising accounting's non-neutral nature (Miller and O'Leary 1987; Napier 2006 ).
In the field of historical research, there is a need to pay attention to the contextual factors of the period under investigation (Parker 1999, 18) in order to accurately contextualize the phenomenon locally (Carnegie and Napier 1996, 7) . The experience of the Monte can be contextualized starting from the last decades of the 15th century, when the cities of central and northern Italy were the cradle of an original model of credit organization based on pawnbroker loans issued at modest interest rates. This model was called the Monte di Pietà (Avallone, 2007) . The new credit institution was the result of a long lasting and complex theoretical debate on the use of money, which had begun with members of the Franciscan Order in the central centuries of the Middle Ages (Kaye, 2000; Todeschini 2009 ). Some representatives of the Observant Minors, who had made themselves autonomous from the Franciscan Order at the end of the 14 th century, proposed the foundation of the new institute, which aimed to financially support the poorer, but not the poorest (the so-called pauperes pinguiores), by removing the former from the clutches of usurers (Muzzarelli, 2001 ).
In a period of rapid population growth, which generated increasing tensions in the market for basic needs, thus causing widespread impoverishment, the Monti represented a critical institutional innovation: they were able to respond to concerns of both an economic and moral nature (Fontaine, 2008) . By countering the primacy traditionally exercised in consumer credit by the Jewish banks, the Monti aimed to work for the common good of the Christian community (Todeschini, 2016) . Hence, for the Monti, the purpose of lending was to rationalize and moderate the consumer credit market by encouraging easier access to the market among the lower middle class. For this reason, the Monti have also been described as a form of 'more socially responsible consumer credit ' (van der Wee, 1993) .
The creation of the Monti di Pietà significantly impacted the economic culture of the time. It contributed to mitigating the vexata quaestio of the condemnation of usury, which had been constantly reaffirmed by the Roman Church since the early centuries of the Christian era (Tan, 2002; Evangelisti, 2016) . The bull Inter multiplices issued in 1510 by Pope Leo X (Giuliano de' Medici), a descendant of a powerful family of Florentine bankers, legitimized the demand for charging interest on loans issued by the Monti, or 'denarino', by arguing that interest payment was necessary for meeting operating activities and managing expenses (Vismara, 2004) .
During the early modern age, the number of Monti di Pietà operating in the Italian peninsula ranged between 650 and 700 and were located in both cities and villages, primarily in central and northern Italy, but also in the South (Montanari 1999) . The organizations became promoters of civic identity, and, until the end of the eighteenth century, they represented the core of the Italian banking system (Fanfani, 2003; Cipolla, 1993, 125; Barile, 2012; Menning, 1993; Del Sordo et al., 2013, p. 278) . Over time, the Monti significantly expanded their functions, collecting deposits, granting loans to towns and state courts, issuing censis (annuities), dispensing dowries to impoverished young women and performing treasury functions on behalf of local charitable institutions (Fornasari, 1993; Menning, 1993; Carboni & Muzzarelli, 2008) .
In 1796, the Monti suffered the 'pillage' (spoliazione) led by Napoleon, which consisted of the removal from their coffers, 'by right of conquest', of money and precious pledges, which were then used to finance war expenditures (Varni, 1996) . In 1807, by decree, the Monti also lost their administrative autonomy by being gathered together, by decree, into the Napoleonic Charitable Congregations. In this situation of functional and institutional break down, the Monti temporarily ceased to conduct the complex tasks it had carried out in the early modern age. Then, during the age of restoration, the Monti regained their autonomy almost everywhere.
The central role played by the Monti in the Italian banking system over the centuries must also be considered in light of the multiple and recurrent attempts to bend the operations of the Monti to their natural purposes. This is probably the most interesting and unknown part of the Monti's long life. Indeed the strengthening of the managerial role -by members of the patriciate -corresponded to a series of misappropriations and abuses despite the presence of a seemingly solid system of crosscheck lead by both municipality and archbishop following the provision of the Trent Council. City patriciates, urban magistrates and various professionals, particularly managers called massari, involved in the internal administration of the Monti, changed the destination of funds and/or stole huge amounts of money from funds reserved for normal use. 'Intacco del massaro' was the term used by contemporaries to indicate fraudulent actions that were detrimental to the Monti (Ferlito, 2009) . The 'intacco' stole resources from secured credit and highlighted a scant capacity to control the activities of those institutions. As has been noted, "relaxation of the initial ethical rigor, inadequate supervision, establishment of internal family dynasties, collusion between administrators and staff could cause" heavy financial losses, compromising the functionality of the 'economy of charity' of which the Monti were one of the main pillars (Carboni 2015, 169) . Managers could steal by using different techniques, which were more or less sophisticated: from the simple theft of cash to the purloining of the precious pledges provided as collateral and from over-evaluation of the pawns to the prolonged and systematic under-evaluation of the sums returned to the Monti by pledges (Fornasari 2017 ).
The present research draws upon original 18 th and 19 th century documents found in the Monte di Pietà of Ravenna and offers an internal perspective of the development of accounting technology before and after an 'intacco' episode, thus attempting to shed light on the significance of accounting in that context. The originality of the Ravenna episode, compared to other similar ones experienced by Monti, consists in its extension over time and in its recurrence by three generations of administrators linked by kinship bonds, who systematically damaged the Monte between 1797 and 1837.
A direct investigation of the Monte di Pietà of Ravenna's accounting records allowed us to contrast assumptions and evidence, and, for this reason, to achieve conclusions that may be of interest to other researchers (Zan 2004, 147) .
The paper is structured as follows. The next section introduces the pillars of Foucault's thought about power, knowledge and governmentality to lay the groundwork for a social and institutional analysis of the Monte di Pietà's accounting practices. The third section describes the birth and its development of the Monte di Pietà of Ravenna with special attention to the historical context. The subsequent section analyses the response to the 'intacco del massaro' episode among people and accounting practices in order to enable a more responsible government in the Monte di Pietà of Ravenna. The final section aims to explain the changes due to the 'intacco' and its response within Foucault's thought on governmentality and draws some conclusions.
Theoretical Framework
Foucault's studies on governmentality motivated Peter Miller and Nikolas Rose to generate a body of work that has produced several studies inspired by governmentality across the field of social sciences, particularly in accounting.
Discussing the use of power, Foucault showed that from the 18 th century, power mediated finely and often as an invisible hand through practices (Foucault, 1975, 79-112) . Embedded and hidden in practices, power can influence people's actions. In this way, people unintentionally collaborate in their "subjection to power itself" (Hoskin and Macve, 1986) . Power is not something that a group of people or an institutional process can exercise, and power is not only concerned with oppressing and constraining (Foucault 1980) . In fact, the most constraining ways in which power can operate gives rise to new forms of behaviour rather than simply censoring forms of behaviours. Foucault describes how disciplinary practices shifted during the 18th and 19th centuries. For example, acceptable norms of behaviour for people in different fields, such as medicine or psychology (Foucault, 1975) , were introduced, thus shaping a peculiar relationship between power and knowledge in the people that could control the understanding of power in order to control people. The docility of the human being involved in a given society was the result of the disciplinary process (Foucault, 1975) .
Within the power-knowledge relationship, accounting exercises disciplinary power, as the practice is strongly involved in power relations produced in social life (Stewart, 1992) . Following Foucault's thought, accounting makes people more knowledgeable, calculable and governable (Burchell et al., 1985; Hoskin & Macve, 1986 Miller and O'Leary, 1987; Funez, 2005) ; this refutes the conception that accounting is a neutral process aimed toward economic rationality (Miller & O'Leary, 1987; Napier, 2006) .
Another notion that has inspired accounting scholars is Foucault's concept of governmentality. Governmentality is "the ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of power, which has as its target population, as its principal form of knowledge political economy, and as its essential technical means apparatuses of security" (Foucault 1991, 102-103) . To describe the technology used to exercise power, Foucault defines governmentality as a "type of power called government", arguing that "The tendency which, over a long period and throughout the West, has steadily led towards the pre-eminence over all other forms (sovereignty, discipline, etc.) of this type of power which may be termed government, resulting, on the one hand, in the formation of a whole series of specific governmental apparatuses, and, on the other, in the development of a whole complex of savoirs" (Foucault, 1991, p. 103) . Governmentality pervades many institutions and practices in both the state (Neu, 2000; Neu & Graham, 2006) and firms (Dean, 1999; Boyce & Davids, 2004) .
International Journal of Business and Management Vol. 14, No. 7; Governmentality is particularly visible in the 18 th century, when governments started defining their way to act in a changing environment that faced huge increases in expenses due to population growth. Population became the main constituent of the state and, consequently, the object of government, rather than territory. Population is much more than the sum of different individuals; it is "a complex phenomenon" with "a life of its own", which must be mastered according to "specific knowledge and through the use of apparatuses of security" (Foucault 2007, 31-32) . Because population became the new object of government, government required knowledge to assert its dominance (Dean 1999) . This is why, in the 18 th century, it was possible to assist to a deviation from the traditional power of the sovereign, founded on custom, social class and patronage, to "a regime ruled by techniques of government" (Foucault, 1991, p. 101) . These techniques of government are institutional regimes, knowledges, practices and procedures "structured, internalised and normalised to exercise power over and through certain sectors of society" (Wyn & White, 1997, p. 133) .
From the 18 th century, the exercise of power enacted by "assorted attempts at the calculated administration of diverse aspects of conduct", which are "intrinsically linked to the activities of expertise" increased (Rose & Miller, 1992, p. 175) . Thanks to expertise, a "set of problems" is viewed as "specific to the issue of population" (Foucault, 2007, p. 34; Kelly, 2000, p. 304) . The basic principle of modern politics is the constant correlation between individualization and totalization, which informs the "governmentalized" state (Foucault, 1991, p. 103) . According to Foucault, there is an interplay between two broad sets of techniques inscribed within the technology of power (McKinlay & Pezet, 2010, p. 487) : disciplinary power that it targeted toward individuals and apparatuses of totalization that target the entire population.
In the field of accounting studies, the link between governmentality and disciplinary power can be found in Latour's (1987) notion of "action at a distance", which is widely employed by scholars (Sargiacomo, 2009; Lai et al., 2012) . In that vein, accounting is a mirror that can transfer information from distant places and disparate people to a centre that can direct them (Miller & Rose, 1990; Miller & Napier, 1993) and explore the role of experts in fostering governmental policies.
The link between governmentality already offered the opportunity to question the context of Italian non profit sector in the eighteenth-nineteenth century. Grounding on Foucault's concept of governmentality some scholars tried to identify the systematic ties between political discourse, forms of rationality and technologies of government during the first period that Napoleon governed Ferrara in northern Italy (1796-99) (Maran et al., 2014) . Other authors examined the role of accounting in the power/control relationship between the Papal State and an eighteenth-nineteenth century Italian University (Madonna et al., 2014) or the Fascist regime and the and an the University of Ferrara (Papi et al. in press) using a Foucauldian episteme of disciplinary power and governmentality. Their work revealed how supervised education gradually became a more refined tool of Christian morality, along with papal control of the institution and its expenses. The present paper is situated in the same area of investigation, the context of Italy in 18 th and 19 th centuries, and analyses the 'intacco del massaro' episode in the Monte di Pietà of Ravenna and its response within Foucault's thought on governmentality.
Methodology
Authors recommend that accounting history scholars embrace narrative and interpretational history to conduct their research (Previts et al. 1990a; 1990b) . Following this suggestion, the present research employs a narrative feature when describing accounting characteristics and its changes due to the specific need to enable more responsible governance within the Monte di Pietà of Ravenna. Moreover, the current study has an interpretational nature (Parker 2015) when highlighting the relationship between the ways to exercise power and discipline and the use of accounting technology in the Monte.
The present study draws upon original 18 th and 19 th century documents found mainly in the Monte di Pietà of Ravenna, and the methodology of investigation is based on an archival analysis. The direct investigation of original accounting records allows researchers to test hypotheses against evidences of practice, and, for that reason, findings of studies based on that methodology of investigation may have profound influence on future research (Zan, 2004, p. 147) .
The Historical Archives of the Monte di Pietà of Ravenna (henceforth ASMPR) keeps records from 1296 to 1939. Up to now, thanks to the partial preservation of its historical archive, it contains 538 archival units. There are three well-identified thematic groups of documents. The first group includes institutional and administrative acts, such as the Statutes (Capitoli) of 1736, the Decrees of the Presidents (1648-1805) and Administrative Correspondence (1694-1837). The second group concerns the Monte accounting documents that certify management and credit pawn activity. The most important series are the 'Main Ledger said Cash book' (1492-1638), the 'Book and chest of the three keys' (1638-1784), 'Books of census ' (1688-1767) Vol. 14, No. 7; Archbishop, Antonio Codronchi, confirmed the institute's solidity but at the same time clarified a number of critical issues (ASMPR 1785: cc.62-63, see again Table 2 ). The first of them was scant liquidity caused by the extraordinary growth of pawn loans, which had been due to the destabilizing effects of the liberalization of the grain trade on consumers and the excise regime decided by Pope Pius VI in 1786. The Presidents sought to respond to the progressive depletion of cash by increasing the interest (denarino) on loans and reducing pawns by half (Baravelli, 1996) . With the advance of the French army on the Italian peninsula, the financial difficulties of the Monte paradoxically stemmed from an increase in lending to the poorest sections of the population as well as to the aristocratic, artisanal and mercantile classes, as exemplified by the large amount of jewels and gold and silver objects among the pledges received. Although devastated by the 'Napoleonic pillage', which refers to the 1796 seizure of funds from the Monte of Ravenna by Napoleonic forces, the money kept on hand and in valuable pledges (in this case for a figure equal to almost 34,000 scudi) did not prevent the rapid resumption of the Monte's activities. This was urged by Archbishop Codronchi, who denounced the growth of 'beggars ... for the total extinction of the Monte's (ASMPR 1796) and it was supported by the Council of the Elders, which was also aware of the institute's importance for social security in the city. The raising of money promoted by the municipality and the broad autonomy granted by the French conqueror to the new local oligarchy of money and land, the appropriators of ecclesiastical property, enabled the institute to resume its activities in 1797. Apparently, the Monte re-entered the complex and delicate interplay among the local authorities. This is the context in which, at the end of the 18th century, the most important case of 'intacco del massaro' took place and gave rise, for the first time, to a different way of exercising power over the other people involved in the management of the Monte di Pietà of Ravenna --accounting.
Governmentality in the Monte di Pietà of Ravenna
Among the many cases of 'intacco del massaro' that involved the Italian Monti, the one which concerned the Monte di Pietà of Ravenna between the 18th and 19 th centuries was at the same time the most sensational and exemplary. In effect, its role was significantly weakened by the frauds of three successive stewards of the Monti between 1797 and 1837: Vincenzo, Girolamo and Antonio Dalla Torre. The three managers represented 'a dynasty of massari' tied by kinship, which blatantly and with impunity despoiled the institute of substantial resources in a second 'pillage' after the one by Napoleon Bonaparte (Fornasari 2017; Baravelli 1996 ; Troilo 2017).
People and Accounting in the Monte's Statutes before the 'Intacco'
The Statutes of 1614 (Capitoli) provided that the Grand Council should elect six Presidents (Presidenti), four nobles and two citizens to act as the administrators of the Monte and some Officials (Ufficiali) to act as employees. Among them, the figure of Massaro (Manager) was responsible in front of the Presidents for the functioning of the institute. In subordinate positions to the manager were a Notary (Notaro), who acted as secretary, and two Assessors (Stimatori), a Tailor and a Goldsmith, who respectively conducted appraisal of pledges consisting of cloths and precious metals (AARa 1614: 6-9).
The Presidents remained in office for three years, whereas the Manager's assignment was two years and renewable once. The Presidents did not receive "good money but only a spiritual reward promised by our Lord Jesus Christ" (AARa, 1614: 9) to conduct their duties. They were to be men of strong morality to administer the Monte selflessly.
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According to the 1614 Statutes, the manager had to be chosen in compliance with quality requirements with regard to both moral qualities and professional features; however, professional abilities were often not as important as moral qualities. The Manager had to be "a citizen native in Ravenna, mature for age and leading an exemplary life that is not doing any dishonest or vicious activities. He has to be God-fearing, with good conscience and close to the poor" (AARa 1614: 14). As for the professional requirements, Statutes specified how the Manager should be "able in keeping the accounts as the government of a good family" (AARa, 1614, p. 14).
The figure of the Manager was critical, as he held various functions regarding administration and treasury (depositeria). He determined the organization of the entire credit pawn. His accounting duties included the maintenance of the Cask book (Libro del giro), which detailed the movements of money in the Manager's hand and featured the Book of loans and collections (Transunto di tutti li pegni) and Debtors list (Lista dei debitori).
The Manager could not make any expenditure without the permission of Presidents, who had to authorize any payment mandate. The Presidents then carried out a periodic check on the cash flow, and at the end of each year they also had to produce the Balance sheet of income and expenditure (Bilancio delle entrate e delle uscite), but this was also exerted through the use of specialized professionals, as this function was purely of the accounting nature. The outgoing manager had to compile his Mandate balance sheet (Bilancio di mandato del massariato), which he then passed to his successor, and the Presidents elected two auditors to check the financial management of the previous Manager (AARa, 1614, p. 15).
All these new accounting rules disciplining the moment of changeover between two managers are particularly important because an 'intacco' usually arose when the new manager received, from his predecessor, an amount of pledges granted credit for a certain amount of money (Fornasari, 1993, pp. 178-179) .
The cash of the Monte were fully deposited on the orders of Presidents in a chest (cassa) with three keys, two of which were in possession of the Presidents and one of which remained with a prior Elder. All the money that came into the Monte daily following the redemption of pawns and the payment obtained from rents, flowed into the chest. The Presidents left the Manager only that amount of money, which they judged sufficient for the needs of the poor, and that amount could not exceed 200 scudi. Incomes and expenditures were recorded by the Notary in a book that had to stay inside the chest along with the money (Libro della cassa con tre chiavi -Book and chest of the three keys). If the pledger was receiving the pledge, he paid the loan plus the matured 'denarino' (interest) to the cashier. If the pledges were not redeemed within two years by the pledger, the pledges were sold at auction, and the notary compiled the Book of unredeemed pawn (Libro della sorte) and noted all the pledges to be put up for auction (AARa, 1614, p p. 10-11).
Managers had several duties and to perform them in an honest and rigorous way, a manager could often feel overwhelmed with intolerable hardships and endless chores. In 1615, the manager Francesco Pignatti denounced the inability to successfully carry out his duties, and for that reason the Presidents granted him an Accounting assistant, or Rincontro. This position had to be occupied by a 'uomo honorato' (honourable man) (AARa 1614: 15)and should not be member of the manager's family. The Rincontro would remain in his office for two years and could be confirmed for two more offices if he showed sufficient diligence. The Ricontro's main accounting tasks were to record daily transactions in the Statement of cash (Conto del denaro) with the sums that the Manager had received and paid. Every 15 days, he had also to record in the Book of the cash re-integration (Libro dell'incontro) and all the receipts (bollettini) with incoming and outgoing amounts (AARa, 1614, pp. 23-24).
In 1736, the statutes of 1614 were revised in order to provide some new rules related to the re-election of officers. The Manager appointed for two years could be re-elected three more times for a total duration of eight years, after which the archbishop's consent was required for a further extension of the mandate. Once he completed his term, he could not be re-elected until after at least four years (ASMPR, 1736, pp. 6-7). Even for the task of Notaro, which were biannual and could already be renewed once, the revised statutes made it possible to have a renewal depending on a President's decision (ASMPR 1736: 18) . This extension of mandates follows a direction of less accountability and an even greater centralization of power in the hands of the Manager and indirectly of the aristocracy, as the presidents were (elected by the Grand Council and then by the patrician class) to vote on the appointment and the renewal of a Manager's office.
Despite the provisions of Statutes, the movement of cash and amounts of money in the Manager's hands escaped the control of Presidents, who were required to periodically perform or to commission the auditors with appropriate cash checks. The Presidents therefore decided to appoint a new figure called Computista (Bookkeeper), with responsibilities designed to simplify and rationalize the management of the institute. He was appointed by the ijbm.ccsenet.org
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Some accounting functions were delegated to the Bookkeeper, including the maintenance of Main ledgers (Libro mastro di scrittura doppia del dare e dell'avere), some of which previously belonged to the Manager, such as the Mandate balance sheet (Bilancio di mandato del massariato), when the Manager was confirmed or ceased (ASMPR 1736: 18). Table 2 proposes a synthesis of the President's and Official's accounting duties in accordance with the Statutes of 1614 and subsequent revisions. Although the amendments to the Statutes were going in the direction of simplifying and rationalizing activities in order to improve control, confusion, darkness and lack of transparency still characterized the management of the institute. This was made possible because the Accounting assistant, despite the statutory requirements, did not forward the Book of the cash re-integration to the Bookkeeper, who in turn was unable to fill the Main Ledger. This situation created inevitable dysfunctions and obstacles to good practices of management. While increasing irregularities, it decreased the immediacy in the account checks.
Considering the accounting rules, particular emphasis was given to the financial statement. This statement was made up of a single report that reflected the economic result (Sopravanzo di rendita) as a difference between costs (Pesi e spese) and revenues (Rendita). In the same document, assets (Attività), liabilities (Passività) and equity (Sopravanzo d'attivo) were reported at the beginning and the end of the year, using an aggregate form without indicating the single items (Figure 2 ) (Note 3). In both sections of assets and liabilities, separate columns indicated the total and partial amounts of the various items provided, which were also accompanied by the number of the Ledger page, where the details of its components can be found. The grand total of the amounts in Dare corresponds to the total recorded in Avere, as every financial statement closed in balance. A separation between the Income statement and the Statement of financial position was not envisaged. Hoskin and Macve, 1986; Napier, 2006) . Accounting technologies relied upon a more articulated financial statement that included the institute's transactions and events. The Monte's accounting technologies of government before the 'intacco' relied upon a synthetic Mandate balance sheet, a financial statement covering all the years of the Manager's duties; after the 'intacco' episodes, they depended on a system based on a Financial statement at the year's end and a Budget, both to be prepared annually and on the same exhaustive scheme. In the history of the Monte di Pietà of Ravenna, before reform of the Statutes, the Presidents responsible for administration of the Monte, favoured, or at least did not hinder the Manager's 'intacco'. The Manager experienced huge managerial freedom permitted by the nature of internal rules and accounting technologies, which were not able to act at a distance or to transfer information to the centre that aimed to direct them (Miller and Rose, 1990 ). It did not help the circumstance that the Dalla Torre's dynasty of managers acted during the Napoleonic age, a time during which the Church lost control over Monti's activities, reducing transparency and enabling illegal practices.
The history of the Monte di Pietà of Ravenna may be of interest for several reasons. We assisted in the introduction of a new regime ruled by techniques of government based on accounting practices and procedures internalized and normalized to exercise power over the Monte. It shows the use of accounting technologies to exercise forms of control on the Massari's practice to detect the possible 'intacco' and to exert disciplinary power in the Monte's daily activity.
